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Abstract. Single-trace side-channel attacks are a serious threat to el-
liptic curve cryptography in practice because they can break also cryp-
tosystems where scalars are nonces (e.g., ECDSA). Previously it was
believed that single-trace attacks can be avoided by using scalar multi-
plication algorithms with regular patterns of operations but recently we
have learned that they can be broken with correlation tests to decide
whether different operations share common operands. In this work, we
extend these attacks to scalar multiplication algorithms with precom-
putations. We show that many algorithms are vulnerable to our attack
which correlates measurements with precomputed values. We also show
that successful attacks are possible even without knowledge of precom-
puted values by using clustering instead of correlations. We provide ex-
tensive evidence for the feasibility of the attacks with simulations and
experiments with an 8-bit AVR. Finally, we discuss the effectiveness of
certain countermeasures against our attacks.
1 Introduction
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [36, 39] has gained huge popularity in secure
embedded systems because it offers high cryptographic security with short key
sizes and relatively low computational requirements. The most important oper-
ation in ECC is the scalar multiplication Q = kP where Q and P are points on
an elliptic curve and k is an integer. The scalar k is typically secret and must
remain unknown to attackers in order to maintain the security.
Side-channel attacks on ECC have gained significant amounts of research
interest [17, 18]. We focus on passive attacks where an attacker only observes a
cryptographic device under its normal operation. They can be categorized into
two classes: single-trace attacks, which use measurements from only one scalar
multiplication, and multi-trace attacks, which utilize statistical methods onto
multiple scalar multiplications sharing the same scalar. Single-trace attacks are
much more serious threats because in most ECC protocols (e.g., ECDSA [44])
scalars are nonces, i.e., short-term secrets that change at each protocol execution.
This prevents the attacker from obtaining multiple traces with the same scalar
and nullifies multi-trace attacks. However, the attacker may still often launch a
repeated single-trace attack where she can acquire multiple traces with different
scalars. We focus on (repeated) single-trace attacks in this paper.
The simplest algorithm for computing scalar multiplications is the double-
and-add, where a point doubling (2Q) is computed for every bit of k but a
point addition (Q + P ) only when a bit is one. The double-and-add succumbs
even to simple power analysis (SPA) where measurement traces are observed
visually. It is relatively easy to protect against these attacks by adopting the
so-called atomicity principle. An atomic implementation has a regular pattern
of operations which does not depend on k. This can be achieved, e.g., by using
dummy operations (e.g., double-and-add-always [13]), a regular scalar multipli-
cation algorithm (e.g., Montgomery’s ladder [35, 41]), balancing point addition
and doubling formulea (e.g., [9, 25]), or using a unified point addition and dou-
bling formula (e.g., [7]). Prior to recent advanced single-trace attacks, these
principles were considered sufficient to protect against single-trace attacks.
The history of advanced single-trace attacks began in 2001 with Walter’s Big
Mac attack [52] on exponentiations, where the attacker targets partial multi-
plications computed in each long integer multiplication of an exponentiation.
In 2010, Clavier et al. [11] introduced a single-trace attack on a larger class
of exponentiation algorithms called horizontal correlation analysis by utilizing
ideas from the Big Mac attack together with correlation power analysis. Corre-
lation power analysis was originally introduced against secret-key cryptography
by Brier et al. [8] in 2004 and it was already earlier applied in multi-trace at-
tacks on public-key algorithms by Amiel et al. [1] in 2007. In 2013, Bauer et
al. [4] (see [5] for an extended version) combined the ideas of [11] with Moradi et
al.’s collision correlation analysis [42] and obtained a very powerful single-trace
attack which thwarts many of the state-of-the-art countermeasures. Recently,
further works have built on the ideas of improving Big Mac [15] and collision
correlations [29]. Another trend of attacks uses clustering algorithms to launch
a single-trace attack on ECC. A clustering attack was shown to break an ECC
hardware implementation without any profiling or leakage models by Heyszl et
al. [31]; Sprecht et al. [49] later improved this attack. In addition to these, also
local electromagnetic measurements have been shown to offer means to launch
successful single-trace attacks, e.g., by Heyszl et al. [32].
Precomputations based on P are commonly used to speed up scalar multi-
plications, but they play a role also in side-channel security. Even if SPA can
distinguish point additions from point doublings, it is incapable of distinguish-
ing operands used in point additions. For this reason, the double-and-add algo-
rithm with, e.g., the width-w non-adjacent form (w-NAF), where digits are from
{0,±1,±3, . . . ,±(2w−1−1)} (see, e.g., [28]), offers better protection against side-
channel attacks than a binary expansion, where digits are from {0, 1}. Neverthe-
less, direct use of, e.g., w-NAF still leaks a lot of information about the scalar and
cannot be considered side-channel secure. Fully regular patterns of operations
can be achieved with atomic scalar multiplication algorithms with precomputa-
tions which typically combine side-channel security with efficiency (see, e.g., [19,
30, 45, 46]). Such algorithms have been recently used for side-channel protected
lightweight hardware implementations, e.g., in [47, 48] as well as fast software,
e.g., in [14]. In the light of new advanced single-trace attacks, there have been
doubts about the security offered by these algorithms (see, e.g., [3, 31, 47]).
We show that these doubts are well grounded, at least for processors with
small word sizes. Hence, our paper has significance, in particular, for lightweight
implementations of ECC. Such implementations typically implement ECC on 8-
bit or 16-bit processors (see, e.g., [10, 27, 37, 38, 43, 50]) or utilize datapaths with
small multipliers (e.g., 16-bit multipliers used in [47, 48]). The contributions of
this paper can be summarized as follows:
– We extend existing correlation-based single-trace attacks (in particular, [4, 5,
15, 29, 52]) to scalar multiplications with precomputations. While this type
of correlation attacks have been conjectured to form a serious threat to scalar
multiplication algorithms with precomputations already before, we are not
aware of any works that would have studied this in depth before this paper.
– We show that a clustering-based attack allows the attacker to successfully
attack these algorithms even without relying on a specific leakage model and
with unknown precomputed values.
– We provide comprehensive evidence about the practicability of these attacks
through simulations and experiments with an 8-bit AVR (ATMega163).
– We present a summary of countermeasures.
The paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 discusses scalar multiplication al-
gorithms that we target with our attacks. Sect. 3 describes the attack and its
two variants. Sect. 4 presents simulation results and Sect. 5 presents experiments
with the 8-bit AVR. Sect. 6 discusses countermeasures against the attacks. Fi-
nally, we draw conclusions and discuss topics for future research in Sect. 7.
2 Preliminaries
We assume that Q = kP is computed so that k is a secret nonce and P may or
may not be known by the attacker. Let E(Fq) be an additive abelian group of
points on an elliptic curve, where Fq is the finite field of q elements. The group
E(Fq) is formed by the points that satisfy the curve equation either including or
appended with the point-at-infinity ∞, which is the zero element of the group.
We consider scalar multiplication algorithms that compute kP by using pre-
computations on P . We show the general structure of these algorithms in Alg. 1.
The secret scalar is converted by using a recoding transformation ∆(k) into `
digits d = (d0, d1, . . . , d`−1), where di ∈ D with |D| = n. Let T be a table of n
precomputed points1: Tt ∈ E(Fq) for all t ∈ D. The table T is computed from
the base point P via a precomputation transformation Π(P ). The bulk of the
scalar multiplication is performed in a for-loop that iterates a target transfor-
mation Ψ(R, T, di), where a static T is used depending on the value of di. The
1 For simplicity and without loss of generality, we consider one-to-one mapping be-
tween digit values di and points in T . In practice, the precomputed table may not
include all values; e.g., the values for negative digits can be derived on-the-fly, etc.
Input: Scalar k ∈ Z+, base point P ∈ E(Fq)
Output: Result point Q = kP
1 d = (d0, d1, . . . , d`−1)← ∆(k)
2 T = (T0, T1, . . . , Tn−1)← Π(P )
3 R←∞
4 for i = 0, 1, . . . , `− 1 do
5 R← Ψ(R, T, di)
6 return Q = R
Algorithm 1: The structure of targeted scalar multiplication algorithms
attacker focuses only on transformation Ψ and aims to find the value of di by
utilizing the fact that Ψ uses the precomputed table T according to the digit
value di; i.e., most typically it adds Tdi to R. The attacker does not need access
to the precomputation; e.g., the table T can be stored in a ROM as in [47].
While Alg. 1 depicts an abstract structure, it captures many commonly used
algorithms with precomputations. The most interesting algorithms for our at-
tack are algorithms which utilize a regular pattern of operations and are, thus,
immune to basic single-trace attacks such as SPA. In this paper, we consider
Okeya et al.’s SPA-resistant width-w non-adjancent form (w-NAF) scalar mul-
tiplication [45] as an example of a vulnerable algorithm, but the attack applies
to a large number of scalar multiplication algorithms (see below). For the SPA-
resistant w-NAF, the precomputation Π(P ) computes odd multiples of P :
T = (−(2w − 1)P, . . . ,−3P,−P, P, 3P, . . . , (2w − 1)P ) . (1)
In practice, only positive multiples can be precomputed and negative multiples
computed as a part of Ψ , but this does not have an effect on the attacks. The
recoding ∆(k) finds d with di ∈ D = {±1,±3, . . . ,±(2w − 1)} such that k =
∆−1(d) =
∑`−1
i=0 d`−i−12
iw; details about ∆(k) are available in [45]. The target
transformation is Ψ(R, T, di) = 2
wR+ Tdi .
If the attacker knows the precomputed points that were used in Ψ in all
iterations of the for-loop, then she learns all di and the secret value of k simply
with k = ∆−1(d). Sect. 3 presents how she can find out di if she (a) knows T and
(b) even if T is unknown. In both cases, the attacker must know the algorithm
and its parameters (e.g., w, ` and n), ∆−1, and certain implementation details
of Ψ (see Sects. 3–5).
A large number of scalar multiplication algorithm can be captured by Alg. 1
and are at least potentially vulnerable to our attacks. These include many non-
regular algorithms such as double-and-add, (sliding) window (NAF) methods,
etc. However, we are more interested about regular algorithms which are pro-
tected from SPA but can be vulnerable to our attacks. These include, e.g., reg-
ular w-NAF and m-ary methods [20, 34, 40, 45, 51], regular width-w τ -adic NAF
method for Koblitz curves [46], the regular signed-digit comb methods [21, 30],
and scalar multiplications on curves with fast endomorphisms that use multi-
scalar multiplications with precomputations (e.g., GLV [24] and GLS [23] meth-
ods and, in particular, the recent regular algorithm [19]). Some of these methods
have been recently utilized in lightweight ECC implementations to achieve pro-
tection against single-trace attacks: e.g., [30] was used in [47], [46] in [48], and
[19] in [14]. All deterministic countermeasures inside Ψ such as atomicity of
point addition and point doubling, unified addition formulae, etc., do not work
against the attack and are, thus, also in the list of vulnerable methods when
used in a scalar multiplication algorithm that utilizes precomputations in the
above sense. Montgomery’s ladder [41], Joye’s regular algorithms [33], and other
algorithms, where for-loops iterate only on non-static values, are not vulnera-
ble because there is no static T that would be used in Ψ which is required by
our attacks. However, other similar types of single-trace attacks have recently
identified similar weaknesses also in such algorithms (e.g., [4, 5, 31]).
Because k is a nonce, we focus only on single-trace attacks. However, the
attacker is often able to retrieve t side-channel traces with different scalars (e.g.,
by observing t ECDSA signature generations). This allows her to carry out a
repeated single-trace attack where she trials successive single-trace attacks until
one of them succeeds. The probabilities work for the attacker. Let psta be the
success probability of a single-trace attack. Then, the success probability of a
repeated single-trace attack as a function of t is given by:
pr-sta(t) = 1− (1− psta)t . (2)
E.g., if psta = 2 %, the repeated single-trace attack succeeds with over 50 %
probability only after 35 traces and with over 99 % probability after 228 traces.
These numbers are completely realistic in many practical scenarios.
3 Description of the Attack
We extend the previous advanced single-trace attacks and, in particular, Walter’s
Big Mac [52] and Clavier et al.’s horizontal correlation [11] attacks on exponen-
tiations to scalar multiplications with precomputations. Contrary to collision
correlation attacks [4, 5], which make a decision of which operation was com-
puted by correlating multiple values of a side-channel trace to find out whether
the operations used the same operands, our attack relies on distinguishing which
particular static precomputed value was used in an operation.
Our attack targets the transformation Ψ and, especially, field multiplications
in Ψ which use values from T as operands. We assume that the word-length W of
the processor is small (W  log2 q, e.g,. W = 8 or W = 16) so that elements of
Fq split into multiple words. The words of an element a ∈ Fq are a0, a1, . . . , aN−1
where N = dlog2 q/W e. In particular, we are interested in partial multiplications
of a long integer multiplication (multiprecision multiplication) similarly to, e.g.,
[4, 5, 11, 52]. Let a, b ∈ Fq. Then, a × b requires N2 W × W -bit partial mul-
tiplications ai × bj with all 0 ≤ i, j < N . Although we focus on W × W -bit
partial multiplications of an integer multiplication, the attack can be straight-
forwardly generalized to binary fields F2m or asymmetric W1 ×W2-bit partial
multiplications. It may also be possible to use other leakage sources including,
e.g., memory addresses, register loads and stores, and multiprecision additions.
We assume that the attacker can identify all partial multiplications from
a side-channel trace that belong to a long integer multiplication which uses a
value from the precomputed table T as one of the operands (say, a). The other
operand (b) is considered random2. The attacker collects samples from the partial
multiplications. Let si,j be a sample collected from the partial multiplication
ai × bj . The hypothesis is that si,j depends on the properties of ai and bj (e.g.,
on their Hamming weights) and that utilizing this information allows the attacker
to find out which value from T was used as the operand a.
Following Walter’s example [52], most of the effects of the unknown b can be
filtered out by computing an average over all samples that use ai:
sˆi =
1
N
N−1∑
j=0
si,j . (3)
Even if bj blinds ai in si,j (e.g., because of a particularly low or high Hamming
weight), computing the average efficiently reduces the dependence on the (un-
known) value of b. The averaging acts also as a low-pass filter for filtering out
measurement noise.
A single execution of Ψ typically includes several multiplications with values
from Tdi and information from all of them should be utilized in the attack.
Let M denote the number of such multiplications in Ψ . The attacker collects
sˆi,m0 , sˆ
i,m
1 , . . . , sˆ
i,m
N−1 where i is the index of di and m = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1 is the
index of the multiplication. She concatenates them into a sample vector that
consists of MN averaged samples (MN2 if not averaged):
Si =
(
sˆi,00 , sˆ
i,0
1 , . . . , sˆ
i,0
N−1, sˆ
i,1
0 , . . . , sˆ
i,1
N−1, . . . , sˆ
i,M−1
0 , . . . , sˆ
i,M−1
N−1
)
. (4)
The attacker repeats the procedure for all ` executions of Ψ , after which she pos-
sesses S0, S1, S2, . . . , S`−1 corresponding to digits d0, d1, . . . , d`−1, respectively.
Next, we show two alternatives for finding out di from the sample vectors.
3.1 Correlation Attack with Known Precomputations
We assume that the attacker knows P and Π which allows her to compute the
precomputed table T . Ideally, the attacker would be able to profile a similar
device and use the profile to produce accurate estimates for each value in T , i.e.,
to launch a template attack (see, e.g., [2, 16] for template attacks against ECC).
In the following, we consider a model where the attacker only knows T and is
able to produce the sample vectors S0, S1, S2, . . . , S`−1 from the measurements.
The knowledge of T is typically a weak assumption because P is public in many
protocols.
2 If R is not randomized in the beginning of Alg. 1, b is not random and even more
powerful attacks are possible by considering also its value recursively during Alg. 1.
The attacker computes the table T . Based on its values, she calculates an
estimate vector Et for each t ∈ D. In this paper, we consider Et which are
based on the Hamming weights of the words in T , but other methods can be
used in a straightforward manner. As discussed above, Ψ uses values from T
in M multiplications. Let Tmt be the value that is used in multiplication m if
di = t. Let H(T
m
t,i) denote the Hamming weight of the i
th word of Tmt . We set
et,mi = H(T
m
t,i) and concatenate them with i = 0, . . . , N−1 and m = 0, . . . ,M−1
into an estimate vector corresponding to digit value di = t:
Et =
(
et,00 , e
t,0
1 , . . . , e
t,0
N−1, e
t,1
0 , . . . , e
t,1
N−1, . . . , e
t,M−1
0 , . . . , e
t,M−1
N−1
)
. (5)
The attacker treats each sample vector Si individually by computing corre-
lations between Si and E
t with all t ∈ D. Her digit guess δi for the value of di
is the value t receiving the highest correlation:
δi = arg max
t∈D
(cor(Si, E
t)) . (6)
When all i = 0, 1, . . . , `−1 have been analyzed similarly, the attacker has a scalar
guess δ = (δ0, δ1, . . . , δ`−1) and she can compute a trial scalar multiplication
Q′ = κP with κ = ∆−1(δ). The attack is successful iff Q′ = Q.
3.2 Clustering Attack with Unknown Precomputations
We assume that the attacker is not able to construct T , e.g., because she does
not know P , or Π produces a randomized table T . Thus, she cannot calculate
the estimates Et and is unable to launch the correlation attack of Sect. 3.1. We
assume that the unknown table T remains static for the entire scalar multiplica-
tion (e.g., randomization of T happens only in Π). In that case, the same value
from T is used in Ψ for two iterations i and j if di = dj .
The attacker begins by acquiring sample vectors S0, S1, S2, . . . , S`−1 accord-
ing to (4). She then uses a clustering algorithm, which puts each of them into a
cluster in C = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and obtains a cluster vector C = (c0, c1, . . . , c`−1)
where ci ∈ C. If the clustering was made correctly, then ci = cj iff Si and Sj used
the same value from T and, thus, di = dj . In this paper, we use unsupervised k-
means clustering, but other clustering algorithms can be straightforwardly used
and some may lead to better results in practice.
Each cluster in C represents a digit value in D, but the mapping pi : C → D
is unknown to the attacker. There are in total n! possible mappings and if n is
small, the attacker can trial all of them. She iterates over all possible pi, finds
δ = (pi(c0), pi(c1), . . . , pi(c`−1)), and checks if κ = ∆−1(δ) is equal to k until one
of them is successful. If the clustering is correct, this process always returns the
correct pi. The attacker does not need to know specifics about the implementation
of long integer multiplications in order to launch the clustering attack, because
she can directly cluster sample vectors without the averaging of (3).
Clustering is a viable attack strategy only when n, the number of possible
digits (clusters), is small. First, n! quickly becomes very large which eventually
makes finding the correct pi impossible. E.g., n! = 16! ≈ 244.25 is hard, but
possible, to brute-force, but 32! ≈ 2117.66 is already completely impractical.
Second, `, the number of digits in d, gets smaller when n and w grow. Hence, n
becomes close to ` and each digit value appears only few times (or not at all)
in d and clustering cannot gain much information about d. While the clustering
attack is in general weaker than the correlation attack, it does not make any
assumptions about the leakage of a device under attack. Hence, if the leakage
model used for constructing Et is inaccurate, then the clustering attack may
outperform the correlation attack.
Clustering has been previously used in side-channel attacks on ECC by Heyszl
et al. in [31]. They used it for launching an attack without any profile about the
device (a hardware implementation) by clustering repeating patterns in a power
trace; i.e., they would cluster the entire trace of Ψ . In our case, the attacker
is expected to have more information about the device and its operation as
described above, which allows her to use clustering on processed samples.
4 Simulations
We consider the following simulation setup to study the feasibility of the attacks.
The simulations were performed with Matlab R2015b. We consider scalar mul-
tiplications on NIST P-256 curve with the base point from [44]. We assume that
the SPA-resistant w-NAF method from [45] is used so that one precomputes
odd multiples ±P,±3P, . . . ,±(2w − 1)P . We experiment with window widths
w = 2, 3, 4, 5 and word sizes W = 8, 16. Because we consider negative points
as part of T , the number of points in T is n = 2w and the table consists of
Tt = tP = (xt, yt) with t ∈ D = {±1,±3, . . . ,±(2w−1)}. Digits di are drawn uni-
formly at random from D. The number of digits is ` = d256/we = 128, 86, 64, 52
for w = 2, 3, 4, 5, respectively.
The transformation Ψ consists of w point doublings followed by a point ad-
dition. The point addition R← R+ Tdi is the interesting part of Ψ . We assume
that it is computed using mixed affine-Jacobian coordinates using the algorithm
from [28], which is given in App. A. This algorithm includes two multiplications,
x2 × t1 and y2 × t2, where x2 and y2 are values from T ; i.e., M = 2.
In the simulations, we construct the sample vectors by deriving a sample
value si,j = s
(s)
i,j + s
(n)
i,j for each partial multiplication ai × bj . The operand
ai is a W -bit word of a coordinate selected from T by using di (x-coordinate
for the first multiplication and y-coordinate for the second). The operand bj
is selected uniformly at random from [0, 2W − 1]. The signal part is given by
s
(s)
i,j = H(ai × bj), normalized to zero mean and unit variance (σ2s = 1). The
measurement noise s
(n)
i,j is white Gaussian noise with variance σ
2
n. The noise level
σn is incremented in steps of 0.1. The noisy samples si,j are averaged to sˆi by
using (3). The averaged samples from the two multiplications are concatenated
into a sample vector Si corresponding to digit di by using (4). The length of a
sample vector Si is MN = 2 · d256/W e which gives either 64 or 32 samples for
W = 8 and W = 16, respectively.
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Fig. 1. Results of the simulated correlation attack (W = 8 and W = 16), averaged
from 10,000 scalar multiplications for each noise level.
4.1 Simulated Correlation Attack
The correlation attack is simulated directly as described in Sect. 3.1.
The estimates Et are constructed by setting
Et = (H(xt,0), H(xt,1), . . . ,H(xt,N−1), H(yt,0), H(yt,1), . . . ,H(yt,N−1)) , (7)
where xt,i and yt,i are i
th word of the x and y coordinate of Tt, after which
they are normalized to zero mean and unit variance. We use Pearson’s linear
correlation coefficient as the correlation function in (6).
Fig. 1 plots the results of the simulated correlation attack as a function of the
noise level σn. It shows the success rates for individual digits di and entire scalars
d; i.e., which percentage of digits and `-digit scalars were guessed correctly. The
digit success rates are only for evaluating the results of simulations, because
in practice the attacker cannot verify the correctness of individual digits. The
results are averages from 10,000 scalar multiplications (52,000–128,000 digits
depending on the width w) for each noise level.
Fig. 1(a) shows that the correlation attack is extremely powerful with W = 8
when noise is small: the attack works with 100 % success rates for all w. Even
high noise does not prevent an attack completely and allows a successful repeated
single-trace attack as a consequence. The window width w has a surprisingly
small effect on the success rates. This is partly explained by the fact that `
gets smaller for larger w which mitigates the effect of a lower digit success rate.
On the other hand, Fig. 1(b) shows that the attack almost completely collapses
when W = 16. We see that attacks are successful only with low noise and, even
then, with rather low success rates. However, even low success rates are enough
to launch a successful repeated single-trace attack.
The leakage model s
(s)
i,j = H(ai×bj) used in Fig. 1 is quite pessimistic because
the input operands do not have a direct contribution to the leakage, but only
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Fig. 2. Results of the simulated correlation attack (W = 16) using the alternative leak-
age model with (a) ω = 0.5 and (b) ω = 0.1, averaged from 10,000 scalar multiplications
for each noise level.
through the result of ai × bj . Our experiments (see Sect. 5) hint that a has a
significantly stronger contribution to the leakage in practice. This motivated us
to experiment with a different leakage model. We selected the following model
s
(s)
i,j = H(ai × bj) + ω(H(ai) + H(bj)); in this model, the term H(ai × bj) still
dominates but a has also a direct contribution through H(ai) with a weight ω.
Results with the alternative leakage model are shown in Fig. 2 for ω = 0.5, 0.1.
They show that if H(ai) contributes to the leakage directly even with a small
weight, the correlation attack succeeds with high success rates for all w even if
W = 16 (except w = 5 when ω = 0.1).
4.2 Simulated Clustering Attack
Simulations of the clustering attack proceed similarly with the simulations of
the correlation attack except that instead of computing correlations, we follow
the blueprints of Sect. 3.2. In the simulation, we clustered ` sample vectors to n
clusters by using k-means clustering. We evaluated results of clustering in two
ways. For w ≤ 3, we performed a brute-force search through all n! possible pi
(see Sect. 3.2). Even if this failed in finding the correct scalar (clustering was
erroneous), we found the best pi by counting the number of correct digits. For
w = 4, brute-force is expensive and, hence, we only checked whether clustering
was correct, i.e., whether all digits with the same values were clustered into same
clusters (if this is the case, then the correct scalar can be found via brute-force).
Because we lacked the best pi, we did not provide digit success rates for w = 4.
In reality, the attacker needs to brute-force through n! possibilities in order to
find whether the attack was a success. Fig. 3 collects results from simulations of
10,000 scalar multiplications per noise level σn (in steps of 0.1) for w = 2, 3, 4
and W = 8, 16. Width w = 5 was not simulated because then n = 32 and n!
prevents the attack in practice (see Sect. 3.2).
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Fig. 3. Results of the simulated clustering attack (W = 8 and W = 16), averaged from
10,000 scalar multiplications for each noise level.
Fig. 3(a) presents the results for W = 8 and shows that the clustering attack
is successful for every w but w has a significantly larger effect than in the case
of the correlation attack. Nevertheless, success rates are non-negligible for all
w (excluding w = 4 and extreme noise) and (repeated) single-trace attacks
are a threat. Noise has a significantly lower effect on the results compared to
the correlation attack and the success rates remain flat for much of the noise
spectrum. Despite being inferior to the correlation attack with low noise levels,
the clustering attack outperforms correlation attack with high noise.
Fig. 3(b) shows that the clustering attack succeeds with relatively high suc-
cess rates even when W = 16 if noise is small. Most importantly, it outperforms
the correlation attack with a large margin. As discussed in Sect. 4.1, the cor-
relation attack fails to correlate leakage of the form H(ai × bj) with estimates
Et based on the Hamming weights. On the other hand, clustering, which does
not rely on a specific leakage model, is significantly more robust in this case.
Although success rates of W = 16 are surprisingly close to those of W = 8 with
low noise, higher noise levels prevent a successful attack significantly earlier.
5 Experiments
We selected for our experiments an 8-bit AVR microcontroller in a smart card
body, a well-known platform commonly used in academic works to evaluate side
channel attacks and countermeasures. Our particular model is an ATMega163
clocked at 4 MHz and containing an 8× 8-bit hardware multiplier that executes
in two clock cycles. We implemented a semi-unrolled operand-scanning based
multi-precision multiplication algorithm in assembly code, but the same results
would be obtained, e.g., with product-scanning or operand-caching. Our code
runs in constant-time and operates at byte level, i.e. for a word-length W = 8.
We monitored the power consumption via a 50 Ω shunt resistor in the ground
Table 1. Success rates from 200 emulated scalar multiplications using multiplication
traces from the 8-bit AVR.
Window Correlation attack Clustering attack? Clustering attack?,
width n Digits (%) Scalars (%) Digits (%) Scalars (%) Digits (%) Scalars (%)
w = 2 4 100.00 100.00 97.79 93.50 87.79 61.00
w = 3 8 100.00 100.00 96.38 75.00 83.11 11.00
w = 4 16 100.00 100.00 n/a 41.50 n/a 2.00
w = 5 32 100.00 100.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a
? Success rates for w = 4 are for correct clustering only
 No sample averaging in use (i.e., without (3))
path. The sampling rate of the oscilloscope was set at 250 MS/s. We used the
I/O communication interface for triggering and synchronizing measurements.
We recorded traces from 256 × 256-bit multiplications, where one operand
was random and the other was selected from the values of T = (±P,±3P,±5P,
. . . ,±15P ), where P is the NIST P-256 base point [44]. The power measurement
traces were pre-processed to extract the points of interest, i.e. the intervals in
which partial multiplications ai × bj were computed, by extracting the second
cycle of each call to the MUL instruction. We further compressed data by taking
the peak value of each clock cycle as a sample si,j from a partial multiplication.
We emulated scalar multiplications with w = 2, 3, 4, 5 using the following
procedure. We first selected d by taking ` = d256/we digits uniformly at random
fromD = {1, 3, . . . , (2w−1)}. Then, for all di, we constructed a trace representing
an emulated point addition R + Tdi so that we randomly drew one trace which
used xdi as an operand from the set of measurements and another which used ydi
as an operand. These represented the interesting operations in Ψ that our attack
targets to (see App. A). Our emulated trace for one scalar multiplication thus
consisted of ` such point addition traces built from two multiplication traces.
We constructed traces for 200 emulated scalar multiplications using the above
procedure by additionally ensuring that one multiplication trace was never used
more than once in any of the emulated scalar multiplication traces.
The results of the experiments with emulated scalar multiplications are col-
lected in Table 1. We provide the results of the clustering attack with and with-
out sample averaging of (3). The latter reflects the situation where the attacker
does not know the algorithm used for the long integer multiplication (and, thus,
cannot use the averaging of (3)). The correlation attack works perfectly for all
window widths: it is always capable of finding all 200 scalars d correctly. The
clustering attack is also able to find correct scalars with high success rates in
every case when samples are averaged with (3). Even without this averaging the
clustering attack is able to find at least a few correct scalars from 200 scalar
multiplications for every w. Hence, a repeated single-trace attack would succeed
in every case with few traces (see Sect. 2).
One distinctive observation from the results of Table 1 is that the clustering
attack experiments outperform the simulated results shown in Fig. 3(a) even
when simulations were performed with zero noise. A logical explanation for this
is that the leakage model used in the simulations, where s
(s)
i,j = H(ai × bj), is
too pessimistic. In practice a appears to have a significantly larger effect on the
leakage at least in the case of an 8-bit AVR (ATMega163).
6 Countermeasures
Given the results from the simulations and experiments, it is clear that both the
correlation and clustering attack are potential threats also in practice. As dis-
cussed, e.g., in [5], Coron’s three countermeasures against DPA attacks [13] do
not offer protection against these single-trace attacks. Hence, more efficient coun-
termeasures are needed in practice. Our attacks can be made significantly more
difficult with the same countermeasures as other attacks of the same trend [3, 5].
We survey existing countermeasures based on hiding and masking (particularly,
from [5, 11]) and discuss their effectiveness in the case of our attacks.
6.1 Hiding
The attacks require that the order of partial multiplications (a) is known by
the attacker or (b) remains the same for the entire scalar multiplication for the
correlation attack and the clustering attack, respectively. Randomizing this order
serves as an effective countermeasure against both attacks (and other similar
types of attacks). The order can be randomized in multiple ways (see [5] for
different options) and the number of permutations can grow up to N2! [5]. To
avoid our attacks, it is essential to randomize the order of ai in the partial
multiplications. This can be done up to N ! permutations.
Randomizing the order of partial multiplications can lead to difficulties in
efficient implementation of long integer multiplication because of carry propaga-
tion when accumulating different partial multiplications. E.g., randomizing the
order prevents from using efficient long integer multiplication algorithms such as
Comba’s product-scanning algorithm [12]. If only the order of partial multiplica-
tions corresponding to a specific result word is randomized, then the low number
of possible orders for low and high words may still allow successful attacks. Also,
the amount of randomness may become a practical problem because the number
of multiplications that needs to be randomized in one scalar multiplication is
often large. Some of these technical issues were solved in [3].
6.2 Masking
Both attacks require that the table T is static for one scalar multiplication (i.e.,
it does not change during the for-loop in Alg. 1). The correlation attack requires
that T is known by the attacker, which can be prevented by randomizing the
entries of T in Π(P ), e.g., by randomizing the base point by using Coron’s
countermeasure from [13]. However, the clustering attack will not be prevented
with this because the table remains static for the for-loop and the computations
of Ψ . The following masking thwarts both variants of the attack.
Let r be a random value in Fq. Then, we get the (additively) masked precom-
puted value by computing a′ = a+r. Multiplications are then computed by first
computing c′ = a′×b and second c = c′−r×b. Masking prevents the correlation
attack because the attacker does not know the value of a′. The precomputed
values must be remasked for every multiplication (or at least several times in
each scalar multiplication) to thwart the clustering attack. We must also ensure
that b is random; otherwise r × b may leak sensitive information. This can be
achieved, e.g., by randomizing the base point.
Clavier et al. [11] considered a scheme where both operands are masked:
a′ = a + r1 and b′ = b + r2. Then, c′ = a′ × b′ and c = c′ − a × r2 − b × r1 −
r1 × r2. This countermeasure does not apply in the case of our attacks: if fresh
randomness is used for each multiplication, then it is possible to attack a × r2
and, if randomization of a is done only in the beginning of a scalar multiplication
(in Π(P )), then there is again no protection against the clustering attack.
Masking comes with a significant performance penalty because M addi-
tional multiplications are required in each execution of Ψ . However, M is often
small (e.g., two). Another disadvantage is that the countermeasure requires large
amounts of randomness (` ·M · dlog2 qe bits per scalar multiplication).
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We studied single-trace side-channel attacks against scalar multiplications with
precomputations. We presented two alternative approaches: one based on corre-
lations and the other on clustering. We showed that they both pose a practical
threat to scalar multiplication algorithms previously considered secure against
single-trace attacks. In particular, implementations that use small word sizes are
at risk. We demonstrated that it is possible to retrieve secret scalars from mul-
tiplications performed with an 8-bit AVR microcontroller (ATMega163). Our
simulation results also show that at least implementations on 16-bit processors
are potentially at risk. The future work includes studying the practical feasibility
of the attacks with experiments on 16-bit and 32-bit processors (W = 16, 32).
The simulations show that the correlation attack is sensitive to the type
of leakage from the device. Consequently, leakage from integer multiplication
should be studied more thoroughly in order to validate the feasibility of the
(correlation) attack in processors with larger word sizes.
We considered the correlation and clustering attacks separately but they can
be used also as a combination. E.g., the result from a correlation attack can
be used as an initial clustering for a clustering attack or used in searching the
correct mapping pi between clusters and digit values faster than brute-forcing
through all possibilities.
If the attacker can select the base point P , then she can make sure that
different entries in the table T have distinctive fingerprints (e.g., very low Ham-
ming weights for different words). Such an attack could be seen as an extension
of refined power analysis [26] or doubling attack [22] to scalar multiplications
with precomputations.
Future work includes research on methods that can find long-term secrets by
utilizing partial information about the nonces, similarly to, e.g., [6]. For instance,
how could the results of clustering help the attacker, when she knows which digits
had same values with high probability (but with some errors in them). The case
with correlations seems more straightforward because she can simply fix digits
with the highest correlations and use methods similar to [6].
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A Point Addition Algorithm
Input: P1 = (X1, Y1, Z1) and P2 = (x2, y2)
Output: P3 = (X3, Y3, Z3) = P1 + P2
1 t1 ← Z21
2 t2 ← t1 × Z1
3 t1 ← x2 × t1
4 t2 ← y2 × t2
5 t1 ← t1 −X1
6 t2 ← t2 − Y1
7 Z3 ← Z1 × t1
8 t3 ← t21
9 t4 ← t3 × t1
10 t3 ← t3 ×X1
11 t1 ← 2t3
12 X3 ← t22
13 X3 ← X3 − t1
14 X3 ← X3 − t4
15 t3 ← t3 −X3
16 t3 ← t3 × t2
17 t4 ← t4 × Y1
18 Y3 ← t3 − t4
19 return (X3, Y3, Z3)
Algorithm 2: Point addition over E(Fp) : y2 = x3 − 3x + b in affine-
Jacobian coordinates [28]. The targeted multiplications are boxed.
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